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De-industrialization: strengths and weaknesses as a key concept for understanding post-
war British history. * 
 
Jim Tomlinson 
 
This article argues for a central role for the concept of de-industrialization in 
understanding the evolution of the economies of urban Britain in the years since 1945.  
Above all, it is suggested, this concept is crucial because it focuses attention on the 
consequences of the transition from an industrial to a service-dominated labour market. 
To make this argument requires a careful definition of the term, along with recognition 
of its potential weaknesses as well as strengths. Key issues are highlighted by drawing 
on three diverse urban areas, which help to show the ubiquity of the process, but also 
its diverse patterns, chronologies and impacts. These examples are a stereotypical ‘post-
industrial city’ (Dundee); a major city where de-industrialization has played an under-
regarded role in developments (London); and a medium-size town in the South of 
England (High Wycombe), where the decline of a core industry (furniture) was crucial 
to its recent history. The final sections analyse the relationship between de-
industrialization and other key frameworks commonly deployed to shape understanding 
of the recent history of Britain: ‘decline’, ‘globalization’, and ‘the triumph of neo-
liberalism’. 
 
     I 
 
Initial accounts of de-industrialization in Britain saw it as a problem of the national 
economy, and discussion focussed on the output and macroeconomic, especially 
balance of payments, aspects.1 When a major public debate using this term erupted in 
the 1970s, the predominant view amongst economists at that time was summarised by 
Cairncross, who argued that de-industrialisation ‘is a matter for concern if it jeopardises 
our eventual power to pay for the imports we need.’2  
 
This focus on the national economy meant little regard was had at that stage to the 
spatial aspects of the problem. As Martin and Rowthorn noted, it was the American de-
industrialization literature of the early 1980s that brought this dimension to the fore, 
especially because of its concerns with ‘capital flight’ within the US economy, and the 
consequent flow of jobs from the North-East ‘rust-belt’, to the South and West ‘sun-
belt’.3 
                                                 
*I am grateful to my Glasgow colleagues, Jim Phillips and Valerie Wright, along with Jörg 
Arnold, Otto Saumaraz Smith and Tobias Becker for very helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper. I also thank Helena Chance of Bucks New University for help with references 
on the High Wycombe furniture industry. 
1 F. Blackaby, (ed.), De-industrialisation (London, 1979); A. Singh, ‘UK industry and the 
world economy: a case of deindustrialisation?’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1 (1977), 
113-36. R. Bacon and W. Eltis, Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers (London, 
1976) focussed on the labour market, but only in the sense that they argued that employment 
in industry had been ‘crowded-out’ by public sector employment. 
2 A. Cairncross, ‘What is De-industrialisation?’ in Blackaby (ed), De-industrialisation, 17. 
3 R. Martin and R. Rowthorn (eds.), The Geography of Deindustrialization (London, 1986), 
xix; the most important American work was B. Bluestone and B. Harrison, The 
Deindustrialization of America. Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the 
Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York, 1982). 
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The concern with the balance of payments consequences of de-industrialization still 
animates some discussions, but it has become harder and harder to argue that the current 
account deficit, which has grown almost continuously since the 1980s, acts as a major 
constraint on policy as envisaged in the debates of the 1970s. Indeed, despite this 
burgeoning deficit, the balance of payments has largely disappeared as an economic 
policy concern over the last thirty years.4 Rather, since the early 1980s, not least 
because of the employment collapse at the beginning of that decade, the British 
literature followed the American in placing much more emphasis on the employment 
consequences of de-industrialization, and on the spatial aspects of those consequences. 
 
This article starts from the position that we should indeed focus on changing patterns 
of employment because of their links to economic welfare.5  The post-war period, 
despite the hopes of some, has not seen the demise of the reliance of the great bulk of 
the population on wage income.6 There has been a clear failure to move to ‘asset-based’ 
welfare, and, the project of a ‘property-owning democracy’ espoused by the Right and 
some elements of the Centre-Left, has turned out in practice to have results almost 
entirely in housing. 7 While home ownership has given economic security to some, it 
has distributed that security unevenly, and may have contributed to macroeconomic 
instability. 8 So the traditional understanding that under capitalism most people 
continue to rely on waged work for economic welfare remains accurate. 
 
What has been the effect of de-industrialization on the labour market? In summary, it 
has meant the radical decline in activities that offered large amounts of regular, 
relatively well-paid employment to working-class people with relatively limited 
educational qualifications (but often with high levels of job-specific skills). The now 
dominant service sector, in contrast, is characterised by a much more polarized range 
of jobs, with formal educational qualifications much more important in determining 
                                                 
4 J. Tomlinson, Manging the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of British Economic Life from 
Beveridge to Brexit (Oxford, 2017), 206-28. 
5 These arguments are made at greater length in J. Tomlinson, ‘De-industrialization not decline. 
A new meta-narrative for post-war British history’, Twentieth Century British History 27 
(2016), 76-99.  
6 Though the rapid rise in self-employment, from 3.2 million in 2000 to 4.7 in 2015 (15 per cent of all 
employees) complicates the picture. Traditionally in official social categorisation the self-employed  
have been grouped with employers, but this no longer seems appropriate given how much of this is a 
recourse for those unable to find a job: M. Savage, Social Class in the Twenty-First Century  (London, 
2015), 40-1, 394, 397.  For the recent data:  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/art
icles/trendsinselfemploymentintheuk/2001to2015 (accessed 15 June 2017).  
7 J. Froud, S. Johal, J. Montgomerie and K. Williams, ‘Escaping the tyranny of earned income? The 
failure of finance as social innovation’ New Political Economy, 15 (2010), 147-64. B. Jackson, 
‘Revisionism Reconsidered: “Property-owning democracy in post-war Britain’ Twentieth Century 
British History, 16 (2005), 416-40. 
8 On the distribution, J. Wadsworth, ‘Eyes down for a full house: labour market polarisation 
and the housing market in Britain’ Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45 (1998), 376-92; 
A. Hood and R. Joyce, ‘The economic circumstances of cohorts born between the 1940s and 
1970s’ Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2013; on the destabilising effects:  Offer, ‘Narrow 
banking’. 
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who gets the ‘lousy or lovely’ jobs.9 This polarization is associated not just with great 
divergences in wage levels, but also less security for those at the bottom end; work for 
many has become much more uncertain and precarious.10 
 
In making this distinction between an ‘industrial’ and a ‘service’ dominated labour 
market we must be careful to historicize and not idealize the former. Historically 
industrial labour has not always been characterised by stability, and it is paradoxical 
perhaps that the relative stability and prosperity of work in this sector is most evident  
in the post-war ‘Golden Age’, even as the sector’s role in the economy passed its peak. 
So the positive features of industrial labour were in part contingent on wider 
circumstances. These included the macro-economic environment, but also the ‘virtuous 
circle’, whereby prosperous industrial work aided the effectiveness of trade unions, and 
effective trade unionism helped to underpin better conditions for workers in industry. 
 
The standard categorizations of ‘industry’ and ‘services’ are not directly related to the 
labour market, so the fit between these categories and the employment characteristics 
we are interested in is by no means complete.  For example, we should include in our 
definition of ‘industry’ employment in railways and utilities, which fall outside the most 
commonly used definition of industry. In addition, there are activities in the service 
sector which have some of the key characteristics of ‘industrial’ work (eg that done by 
maintenance workers in schools, hospitals and universities). Conversely, some kinds of 
less-skilled industrial work have always been casualized and precarious, and the 
incidence of this may have risen in line with the general weakening of demand for 
unskilled labour. Despite these qualifications, in seeking to understand broad changes 
in the labour market ‘de-industrialization’ is the most useful characterisation. 
Alongside its direct contribution to greater inequality and insecurity, it has contributed 
significantly to higher unemployment in the older industrial regions, much of this 
disguised by various kinds of disability and sickness benefits. 11 
 
De-industrialization has also had two effects on the public finances. On one side, higher 
unemployment in the older industrial regions has increased spending on disability and 
sickness benefits, even as the incomes of those reliant specifically on unemployment 
benefits (‘Job Seekers Allowance’) have been relentlessly squeezed since the 1980s.12 
 
But the counterpart to the successful attack on the incomes and standing of the 
unemployed has been the desire to ‘make work pay’ at a time when labour market 
polarization has pushed increasing numbers into levels of poverty wages deemed 
unacceptably low. Hence the enormous growth in in-work benefits, (alongside housing 
subsidies), creating a wage-subsidy system costing around £30 billion per annum. After 
2010, and seeking to cut these subsidies in the name of ‘fiscal consolidation’, this ‘New 
Speenhamland’ system has brought a striking volte-face in Conservative politics, with 
the attempt to switch some of the cost of raising sub poverty level wages on to 
                                                 
9 M. Goos and A. Manning, ‘Lousy and Lovely Jobs: the rising polarization of work in 
Britain’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 89 (2007), 118-33. 
10 G. Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London, 2011); Savage, Social 
Class, 351-7. 
11 C.Beatty, S. Fothergill, T. Gore and R. Powell, The Real Level of Unemployment 2007 
(Sheffield, 2007).  
12 C.Beatty and S.Fothergill, Jobs, Welfare and Austerity (Sheffield, 2016). 
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employers by a statutory ‘Living Wage’.13 But this shift in policy, and some trimming 
of benefit levels, has only slightly dented the public expenditure cost.  
 
So the case for focussing on employment change as the key problem of the national 
economy is a powerful one, and the general pattern is readily apparent in Table1. 
 
Table 1. Proportion of workers in industrial employment in the UK 
 
1957 48% 
1979 38% 
1998 27% 
2016 15% 
 
Source: ONS databank. 
 
But the spatial story, the distribution of sectoral employment change within Britain, is 
more complex. Much of the British literature of the 1980s tended to assimilate de-
industrialization into an older story of regional disparities in economic prosperity, the 
‘North-South divide’ between those areas still suffering the legacy of the decline of the 
nineteenth-century ‘staple’ industries, and those where the ‘new’ industries of the mid 
twentieth-century flourished.14 
 
But this incorporation of de-industrialization into a long-standing regional dichotomy 
appears problematic on two counts. First, the evidence is clear that de-industrialization 
began in the cities, cities distributed throughout the regions of Britain, not least in 
London in the ‘prosperous’ South East.15  Second, a large part of the regional disparities 
in rates of de-industrialization have been a function of how urban those regions were: 
‘The decline in the number of manufacturing jobs in cities and the relative growth 
elsewhere has redistributed jobs between regions. Highly urban regions have declined; 
more rural regions have grown’. 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Manufacturing employment change, 1960-1978, by type of area 
                                                 
13 The Conservatives were bitterly opposed to a legal minimum wage when Labour proposed it in the 
1990s-it was enacted in 1998; J. Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the 
United States (New York, 2008), 207-209. 
14 R. Martin, ‘The political economy of Britain’s north-south divide’ Transactions of the  Institute of 
British Geographers 13 (1988), 389-418. 
15 Martin and Rowthorn, The Geography of Deindustrialization, xvii; S. Fothergill, G. 
Gudgin, M. Kitson, S. Monk, ‘The de-industrialisation of the city’ in Martin and Rowthorn, 
The Geography of Deindustrialization, 216-221. 
16 Fothergill et al,‘The de-industrialisation of the city’, 218. This point cautions us against 
conflating the ‘industrial’ with the ‘urban’. 1981 Census data suggests that at that date, on a 
broad definition of industrial, 38.1 per cent of urban employment fell into that category, 32.1 
per cent of rural: The National Archives: Public Record Office (TNA:PRO) T499/376 
‘Countryside policies’ n.d but 1988. 
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 1960-1978 (as % of 1960) 
London -42.5 
Conurbations -26.5 
Free-standing cities -13.8 
Large towns -2.2 
Small towns +15.7 
Rural areas +38.0 
  
Great Britain -11.5 
  
Source: S. Fothergill, G. Gudgin, M. Kitson, S. Monk, ‘The de-industrialisation of the city’ in 
Martin and Rowthorn, The Geography of Deindustrialization, 231. 
 
Table 2 shows this urban/rural divide in the 1960s and 1970s, before the recession at 
the beginning of the 1980s in which manufacturing employment fell everywhere. It 
makes clear that trend in de-industrialization was hitting urban areas of all kinds, except 
small towns.17 But the generality of the process, and the ‘surprising’ evidence of de-
industrialization of cities generally never thought of as ‘industrial’, doesn’t mean urban 
Britain had a homogenous experience. To examine the spatial diversity of that 
experience we look in detail at three very different urban cases. 18  
 
 
     II 
 
Dundee is a classic ‘post-industrial’ city, once seen as an epitome of industrial Scotland, 
now dominated by services but with a continuing legacy of industrial decline. The 
population of the City, expanding slightly and then stable in the 1950s and 1960s at 
around 170,000, fell in every census after 1971 down to 2001 (with a total decrease of 
20 per cent), before stabilising in 2011. This smaller population exhibited many of the 
signs of the effects of de-industrialization, with an ageing population, high levels of 
unemployment, and poor scores on the Index of Multiple Deprivation.19  
 
But the city’s trajectory of de-industrialization has been far from straightforward, with 
effectively two separate ‘waves’ of that process. Before the First World War Dundee’s 
economy was dominated to an extraordinary extent by one industry, jute manufacturing. 
Drawing on raw jute from Bengal, and selling its products all over the world, 
‘Juteopolis’ was a striking example of the process of ‘imperial globalization’ which 
characterised much of the British economy in the decades before 1914.20 The industry 
was subject to increasingly serious competition from India’s jute manufacturers from 
the 1880s, and by the 1930s the industry had shrunk to a fraction of its pre-1914 size. 
                                                 
17 Fothergill et al offer an intriguing explanation for the generality of this process in the rising land 
requirements in manufacturing combined with restrictions (and costs) of land in urban areas: ‘The de-
industrialisation of the city’, 223-230. 
18 R. Madgin and R Rodger, ‘Inspiring capital? Deconstructing myths and reconstructing 
urban environments, Edinburgh 1860-2010’ Urban History 40 (2013), 507-529. 
19 Dundee City Council – Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2012 Analysis 
http://www.dundeepartnership.co.uk/sites/default/files/SIMD12_Analysis.pdf (Accessed 28 
April 2017). 
20 J. Tomlinson, Dundee and the Empire (Edinburgh, 2014), 23-37. 
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Protection from 1939 stabilised the industry, and thereafter until the late 1960s 
employment fell only slowly. Initially, the post-1945 shrinkage in labour demand from 
jute was more than offset by a successful policy of attracting new manufacturing 
companies, especially American multinationals. Regional subsidies to these companies 
were crucial in delivering an unemployment rate below the Scottish average in the 
1950s and 1960s.  However, the tide turned sharply in the 1970s.  Protection for jute 
was dismantled, and the industry also faced increasing competition from the artificial 
fibre polypropylene, a much less labour-intensive product. Simultaneously, there began 
the ‘retreat of the multinationals’.21 In Dundee this was especially evident in the decline 
in employment at two large American companies producing electronic goods: Timex, 
where employment peaked at over 6,000 workers in 1974, declining to complete closure 
by 1993; and NCR, where employment peaked in 1970, and subsequently shrank to a 
residual, non-manufacturing, presence.22  
 
Two spatial aspects of Dundee’s development should be noted. First, the new jobs 
created there by the American multinationals were not based on ‘capital flight’. Though 
both Timex and NCR were based in the American North-East, the investment in 
Scotland was not a re-allocation of resources away from the USA, but a net addition to 
activity aimed at capturing some of an expanding European market for the companies’ 
products. Similarly, the demise of these activities was not primarily a case of a shift to 
more profitable locations, but largely the result of technological changes that 
undermined the companies’ market position, with, for example, Timex’s production of 
mechanical watches.23 
 
De-industrialization is most dramatically evident in the process of closure of factories 
and mines. Understandably, the traumas of such closure, and the political fights that 
have been a common accompaniment, have dominated much of the literature on de-
industrialization.24 But, of course, as a process de-industrialization is about the limited 
creation of new industrial jobs as much as the loss of the old. When industrial 
employment flourished, some jobs were constantly being lost, but there were plentiful 
replacements. But with de-industrialization ‘deaths’ outnumbered ‘births’ and the 
population of jobs declined. This pattern has been clearly identified in Glasgow, where 
the decline of industrial employment in the City was, quantitatively, as much the result 
of the lack of new job creation as the loss of the old.25 
 
More broadly, of course, the impact of de-industrialization depends upon what jobs, if 
any, fill the gap. In Dundee, a large part of the answer was the public sector, with the 
NHS and higher education, along with the local authority, emerging as the biggest 
employers. This was a common pattern in the ‘post-industrial’ regions. In other parts 
                                                 
21  N.Hood and S. Young, Multinationals in Retreat: the Scottish Experience  (Edinburgh, 
1982). 
22 The Times, 7 May 1983, 9 May 1983, 9 July 1983, 4 September 1984; Hood and Young, 
Multinationals, 106-113. 
23 Equally, Dundee benefitted only marginally from relocation of industry within Britain: a small 
number of jobs were relocated by the Burndept company when their factory at Erith, Kent was blitzed 
in 1942, and the Veeder-Root company relocated a small number of jobs from London in the late 
1940s: TNA:PRO BT177/831 ‘Burndept’; TNA:PRO BT177/884 ‘Veeder-Root’. 
24 See references in footnote 79. 
25 J. MacInnes, ‘The deindustrialisation of Glasgow’ Scottish Affairs 11 (1995), 73-95. 
7 
 
of the country the public sector has played a smaller role, and private sector services a 
much larger one.26 This is perhaps most evident in the case of London. 
 
London might be seen as a long way from Dundee in every regard. But both historically 
were cities of industry. In 1961 Peter Hall emphasized that London had been the most 
important manufacturing centre in Britain for as long as records exist. This position 
rested upon significant shifts in industrial composition, from the historically long-
standing importance of industries such as clothing, furniture and printing, to the growth 
of engineering and vehicles strongly evident in the inter-war years.27 But even before 
the publication of Hall’s landmark book the number of industrial jobs in London was 
in decline. Manufacturing employment in London peaked in the 1950s, and from the 
1960s this trajectory was greatly added to by the loss of jobs in the docks, and many of 
the industries associated with the port of London.  
 
By the early 1980s, the Greater London Council’s London Industrial Strategy was 
predicated upon an analysis which saw London as suffering an acute process of de-
industrialization, without a compensating rise in jobs in other sectors, resulting, they 
estimated, in over half a million Londoners without jobs: ‘the largest urban 
concentration of unemployed people in the advanced industrial world’. 28 The Strategy 
also noted some of the changing localised geographical impacts of the process. In the 
second half of the 1960s and through the 1970s it was concentrated in inner London 
and the East, linked especially to the accelerating decline of docklands in the face of 
containerization.29  
 
De-industrialization was thus integral to the ‘inner-city’ problem which became central 
to discussions of urban Britain from the late 1960s. 30 Part of the population decline of 
London and other major conurbations in the early post-war decades was the result of 
deliberate policy decisions about slum clearance and dispersal, aimed at shifting both 
populations and employment to outer suburbs or new towns.31 The presumption of these 
policies was most of this employment would be in industry, especially ‘light 
manufacturing’, seen as much less location critical than the ‘old staples’. The adverse 
impact of these policies for the centre of cities was recognized from the late ‘seventies, 
though the debate about the scale and nature of these effects continues. 32  
 
                                                 
26 Centre for Cities, Public Sector Cities: Trouble Ahead (London, 2009). 
27 P. Hall, The Industries of London since 1861 (London, 1962); P. Scott, Triumph of the 
South. A Regional Economic History of Early Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot, 2007), 
135-159. 
28 GLC, London Industrial Strategy (1985), 6. This was a highly innovative document, 
seeking a ‘third way’,  away from either Keynesianism or monetarism.  
29 D. Keeble, ‘Industrial decline in the inner city and conurbation’, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, 3 (1978), 101–14. 
30 P. Lawless, Britain’s Inner Cities (2nd. Ed. London, 1989). 
31 The links between this process, the later resiling from it, and broader issues of urban modernism are 
explored in O. Saumarez Smith, ‘The inner city urban crisis and the end of urban modernism in 1970s 
Britain’ Twentieth Century British History 27 (2016), 578-598.  
32 A. Kefford, ‘Disruption, destruction and the creation of  “the inner cities”: the impact of 
urban renewal on industry, 1945–1980’ Urban History, 2016 first view DOI: https://doi-
org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1017/S0963926816000730 discusses Leeds and Manchester; C. 
Collins and I .Levitt, ‘The “modernisation” of Scotland and its impact on Glasgow, 1955-
1979: ‘”Unwanted side effects” and vulnerabilities’ Scottish Affairs 25 (2016), 294-316. 
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In the early 1980s, whilst the problems of the inner-city areas were exacerbated, serious 
de-industrialization took place in West London, especially concentrated in the ‘new’ 
engineering activities which dominated the industrial estates of this part of London.33 
In 1981 19.2 per cent of all jobs in London were in manufacturing, but in the following 
decade this fell to 11 percent, the absolute figure falling from almost 700,000 to 
359,000. Over the same period, total employment in London fell by 300,000.34 
However, manufacturing output in London fell only slightly in this period, emphasising 
the divergence between employment and output trends when productivity is growing 
fast. Also with broader significance is the fact that over the same period while 
productivity in banking, finance and business services grew rapidly (along with output 
and employment), in other service sectors productivity grew much more slowly (though 
faster than in comparable sectors elsewhere in Britain). This set a pattern for London 
which was maintained up to the 2008 crisis: sharply rising productivity in 
manufacturing accompanying a rapid fall in employment; a rapid rise in employment, 
output and productivity in finance; rising output and employment, but slow productivity 
growth, in services.35 
 
By 1991 London had a lower proportion of its workforce in manufacturing than the 
national average. Viewed positively, this can be seen as a result of the buoyancy of the 
financial services sector, though there was also expansion in the lower productivity (and 
lower-waged) parts of service activity. But this shrinkage went along with a falling total 
working population and the evidence of considerable economic problems in parts of the 
city.36  
 
Some critics of the London Industrial Strategy disputed the view that London suffered 
from  a general process of de-industrialization, arguing that the capital’s loss of such 
employment was the result of relocation of its industry to elsewhere in Britain, rather 
than part of a general de-industrialization of the whole country. 37  In part this argument 
is undoubtedly true. As already noted, London’s share of employment in manufacturing 
fell below the UK as a whole by 1991, so its experience was divergent from the rest of 
the country. And relocation rather than simple closure was an important factor in 
London’s industrial experience.  Even in the early post-war years, when total 
employment in manufacturing was expanding, shifts of activity to locations outside 
London were commonplace. A study of North-West London found that in that area 
between 1940 and 1964 147 factories closed down completely, moving all activity 
outside the city.38 
 
                                                 
33 GLC, London Industrial Strategy, 6-7. 
34 D. Graham and N. Spence, ‘Contemporary Deindustrialisation and Tertiarisation in the 
London Economy’ Urban Studies 32 (1995), 898. 
35 There are major problems of  measuring output in financial services: for a summary:  A. 
Haldane and V. Madouros, ‘What is the contribution of the financial sector?’  
http://voxeu.org/article/what-contribution-financial-sectoreg (accessed 29 September 2017). 
36 For discussion of the significance of city population trends generally, see I Turok and V. 
Mykhnenko, ‘The trajectories of European cities, 1960-2005’ Cities, 24 (2007), 165-182. 
37 P. Hare, ‘The London Industrial Strategy: a review article’ Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 33 (1986), 190. 
38 D. Keeble, ‘Industrial migration from North-West London, 1940-1964’ Urban Studies 2 
(1965), 15-32. 
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The forces at work in such relocations seem clear. First, were the physical limits to 
expansion in crowded urban areas, followed by higher rents. For example, rents per 
square foot on the huge Park Royal industrial estate in Acton and Willesden rose tenfold 
between 1939 and 1964. Second was the very tight labour market in the early post-war 
years, resulting in upward pressure on wage costs and high labour turnover. Finally, 
there were the effects of government policy. While regional policy after 1945 greatly 
encouraged the expansion of industrial employment in Dundee (and much of the rest of 
‘industrial Britain’), post-war urban planning actively discouraged expansion of such 
activities in London, by refusing the necessary building permissions.39 
 
Relative to a post-industrial city such as Dundee, London has clearly shown greater 
capacity to deal with the effects of de-industrialization. Private sector service activity 
has been much more buoyant, and the role of the public sector as an employer has been 
much lower. But inequality and poverty remain major features of the city, even as the 
geography of deprivation has become less concentrated in the inner-city.40 
 
The relocation of industry from London, bolstered manufacturing employment 
elsewhere in Britain during the early post-war years.  One beneficiary was the town of 
High Wycombe, in South Buckinghamshire, about 30 miles outside London. 
 
In 1951 Rowntree and Lavers were clear: ‘High Wycombe is an industrial town; by far 
the most important industries are furniture and chair-making’.41  The role of furniture 
in Wycombe was not new, the industry tracing its roots back to eighteenth-century 
chair-making, using timber from the local beech woods.42 Employment in the industry 
reached its peak in1955, at just under 10,000 workers, around 25 per cent of the town’s 
workforce.43  This employment was bolstered by firms migrating from (central) London 
from as early as the late nineteenth-century. But migration was probably at its peak in 
the early post-war years; London’s share of employment in the industry was still 
predominant (over 40 per cent) but was falling in the 1950s, whilst that of High 
Wycombe rose.44  Typical was the shift of factories from Tottenham, a traditional centre 
of the furniture industry in North London. 
 
Although a very different town in many respects, the industrial trajectory of High 
Wycombe after 1945 had something in common with Dundee.  In Dundee the staple 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 17-19. 
40 English indices of deprivation, 2015. https://data.london.gov.uk/apps_and_analysis/english-
indices-of-deprivation-2015/ (accessed 1st May 2017); for the effects of de-industrialization in 
one outer London borough see K. Williams and S. Johal, The Enfield Experiment, Centre for 
Research in Socio-Cultural Change (Manchester, 2013). More broadly:  
http://www.londonspovertyprofile.org.uk/key-facts/  (accessed 1st May 2017). On inequality, 
Savage, Social Class, 269-74. 
41 B. Seebohm Rowntree and G. Lavers, ‘Leisure time activities in High Wycombe’ in 
Rowntree and Lavers, English Life and Leisure. A Social Study  (London, 1951), 376. 
42 S. Grover, ‘The decline of the High Wycombe furniture industry. A case study of  J. Clarke, 
Wycombe furniture makers 1952-2002.’ (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Bucks New University, 
2014), 29-31.  
43 D. Lowe, ‘The furniture industry of High Wycombe since 1870 in relation to the general 
industrial development of the area.’ (Unpublished M.Phil thesis Birkbeck College, University 
of London, 1983), 350. 
44 Ibid., 82, 92. 
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industry, jute, declined (slowly until the 1970s) but there was expansion in engineering; 
in Wycombe the ‘staple’ of furniture also peaked in the 1950s and declined only slowly 
over the next two decades. Engineering employment grew in both places, though this 
began earlier than in Dundee, and owed much to wartime attempts to escape the London 
blitz, rather than to post-war regional planning. From 1938 to 1958 employees in 
engineering in Wycombe expanded in number from 900 to 6,500, and continued to 
increase thereafter, reaching a peak of around 16,000 in the late 1970s.45 
 
As with furniture, some of this growth in engineering came as a result of relocation 
from London, both from the desire to escape wartime bombing, and after 1945 from the 
cost concerns and physical controls arising from regional policy. Whilst located just 
outside the town’s boundaries, the shift of the precision-engineering tobacco-machinery 
company, Molins, from Deptford in South-East London to Wycombe in 1950, was 
typical of the process.46  
 
Like all of industrial Britain, Wycombe was hit extremely hard by the exchange rate 
appreciation of 1979-81, which greatly encouraged the acceleration of the trend for the 
trade balance in furniture to decline, the industry moving into a large trade deficit 
from1981. (Until the 2000s the great bulk of these imports came not from low wage 
Asian countries, but from Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Czechoslovakia).47 Engineering employment was also hit hard.  But as elsewhere in 
Britain, this sudden decline only accelerated a long-term trend towards a shrinking of 
industrial employment. By the end of the twentieth century High Wycombe shared 
some of the prosperity of the commuting towns surrounding London, and a low 
unemployment rate, combined, like Dundee, with an ageing population and continued 
shrinking of industrial employment.48 
 
These three cases emphasize that the post-1945 history of very different types of urban 
areas have all been seriously affected by de-industrialization. The precise patterns, 
forces at work and chronology have differed, as have the long-run impacts on economic 
welfare. But no part of Britain has been immune from its effects. 
 
     III 
 
De-industrialization is one of several narratives which have been widely deployed to 
analyse post-war Britain. Three others are of particular importance: economic decline; 
the ‘triumph’ of neo-liberalism; and, for the most recent decades, the rise of 
globalization. The contention here is not, of course, that these three alternative 
frameworks are valueless, but rather that they are best seen as less fruitful for our 
understanding than de-industrialization. 
 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 125-127. 
46 Ibid.,223, 107-108. In a too terrible symbol of de-industrialization, and the transition to a 
service economy, the demolished Molins’ factory (where the author’s father was once 
employed) was the site of the set for Auschwitz concentration camp in the 2016 feature film 
‘Denial’. 
47 Grover, ‘The decline’, 229-233. 
48 https://www.wycombe.gov.uk/uploads/public/documents/Planning/Planning-
policy/Other/employment.pdf  (Accessed 1st May 2017). 
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From when it was (re-)invented in the late 1950s until the 1980s, economic declinism 
was central to contemporary politics in Britain, finding support across the political 
spectrum. This political positioning in turn stimulated a variety of narratives that 
purported to show the historical roots of this decline, similar to the way in which earlier 
political debate had stimulated declinist histories.49 Since the 1980s, declinism has been 
less evident in political debate, but still survives in journalistic and academic writing.50  
Nowadays, the narrative is mainly supported from the political Left; those on the Right, 
and indeed in the Centre, tend to adhere to the view that Thatcherism ‘reversed decline’ 
and therefore no longer see it as a key problem.51  Historical declinism still has its 
adherents, but the narrative does not dominate as it once did. 52  
 
The complex roots and the weaknesses of declinism as a historical narrative have been 
explored elsewhere, and these arguments will not be repeated here.53  Suffice to say 
that, if we restrict ourselves to the highly conventional (but deeply problematic)54 use 
of GDP growth as the key measure of economic performance, ‘decline’ seems an odd 
word to use to describe long-run British economic performance. According to IMF data 
for 2015, Britain is twenty-fifth in the world ranking of GDP/head, the only large 
countries with a higher level being the USA (eleventh) and Germany (eighteenth).55 
The USA overtook Britain in the late nineteenth century, so the only large country to 
overtake Britain post-1945 is Germany, where in 2015 GDP/head was around twelve 
per cent higher. For a historian the German comparison is especially resonant. In the 
book Made in Germany in 1896, the impending doom of Britain was spelt out; one 
hundred and twenty years later the difference in GDP/head barely exceeds the 
measurement error. 56 On a global scale, Britain worrying about ‘decline’ is akin to a 
                                                 
49 D. Cannadine, ‘Apocalpyse when? British Politicians and British “decline” in the twentieth 
century’, in P. Clarke and C. Trebilcock (eds.), Understanding Decline (Cambridge, 1997), 
261-84; J. Tomlinson, ‘Thrice denied: ‘Declinism’ as a recurrent theme in British History in 
the long twentieth century’ Twentieth Century British History 20, (2009), 227-251. 
50 The ‘decline continues’ theme can be found in L. Elliott and D. Atkinson, Going South: 
Why Britain will have a Third World Economy by 2014 (London, 2012); and in more 
sophisticated terms in E. Engelen, I. Erturk, J. Froud, S.Johal, A.Leaver, M.Moran, A. 
Nilsson and K. Williams, After the Great Complacence. Financial Crisis and the Politics of 
Reform (Oxford, 2011). 
51 Note, for example, how popular ‘mainstream’ journalistic accounts about the British 
economy accept this Thatcherite story: R. Peston, Who Runs Britain?, (London, 2008), 3-4. 
For the historical argument, N. Crafts, ‘British relative economic decline revisited: the role of 
competition’ Explorations in Economic History 49 (2012), 17-29. 
52 M. Kitson and J. Michie, ‘The de-industrial revolution: the rise and fall of UK 
manufacturing 1870-2010’ Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Vol II 
(Cambridge, 2014), 302-329.    
53  Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, chapter 2; J. Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “Decline”: the 
Falling Behind of the British Economy in the Post-War Years’ Economic History Review 49, 
(1996),734-60; Tomlinson, ‘De-industrialization not decline’. 
54 J. Stiglitz, A. Sen, J-P. Fitoussi, Mis-Measuring Our Lives. Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up 
(New York, 2010). 
55 IMF, World Economic Outlook.  
56 In 1999 the Human  Development Index  measures for Germany and the UK were almost 
indistinguishable: 0.921 and 0.923 respectively: N. Crafts, ‘The Human Development Index, 
1870-1999: some revised estimates’ European Economic History Review 6 (2002), 397, Table 
3.  
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millionaire complaining that he is not a multi-millionaire; the great bulk of the world’s 
population have less than a quarter of Britain’s GDP/head. 
 
If we are focussed on the national economy, the point is not, of course, that Britain has 
not and does not face significant economic problems (like almost all economies), but 
that the ‘decline’ literature offers limited insights into the nature and causes of these 
problems, not least because of its tendency to seek for moralistic and ideologically-
charged stories about who to blame for economic adversity. When we turn to the spatial 
differentiation discussed in out three examples above, the notion of ‘decline’ as a 
pathological state seems even less helpful. In the case of Dundee, for example, while 
there have been occasional politically-inspired attempts to find culprits for the 
difficulties of the local economy in the 1970s and 1980s in trade union intransigence, 
such as at the time of the prospective building of a Ford car plant in the city, 
investigation has shown that the great bulk of employers around that time found the 
city’s labour force efficient and amenable. 57 
 
     IV 
 
‘Neo-liberalism’ is a term rooted in economics.58 Most accounts see it as combining 
elements of a number of strands of thought, most importantly neo-classical economics, 
Ordo-Liberalism and Austrian economics.59 The addition of public choice theory added 
an extra, powerful, component. While the original historiography of this ideological 
movement emphasized the role of think-tanks like the Institute of Economic Affairs, 
we now know that the spread of the doctrine was aided from the early post-war years 
by its allies in business and politics.60  But it was only in the crisis years of the 1970s 
that it gained much influence. That influence cannot be understood except in the context 
of the circumstances of that decade, and how the experience of rapid inflation and 
ballooning public deficits was constructed as an indictment of ‘the Keynesian welfare 
state’. In these circumstances, a reinvigorated, right-wing, declinist narrative opened 
the space for the new pro-market, neo-liberal, doctrines to flourish. 61 
 
But how far did this doctrinal flourishing turn into policy success? While undoubtedly 
policy did change from the end of the 1970s, how far was that change deep enough to 
justify the view that neo-liberalism ‘triumphed’? At its most general neo-liberalism is 
characterised by a belief in the moral, political and economic superiority of market 
mechanisms over the state and politics in organizing society. While (some) neo-liberals 
may wish to strengthen the state in specific areas (anti-monopoly laws, policing, the 
military), central to the political aims of neo-liberalism has been an overall ‘rolling-
                                                 
57 C. Woolfson and J. Foster, ‘Corporate reconstruction and business unionism: the lessons of 
Caterpillar and Ford’ New Left Review 174 (1989), pp.52, 54-6; Scottish Development Agency, Dundee 
Labour Performance Study (Edinburgh, 1982). 
58 The term ‘market fundamentalism’ is in many ways more helpful to our understanding than 
‘neo-liberalism’, as it emphasizes the visceral, ideological anti-statism which animated much 
of the policy debate from the 1970s, rather than the ‘rational’ and doctrinal underpinnings. 
59 P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Monet Pelerin (Cambridge, Mass, 2009). 
60 R. Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable. Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 
1931-1983 (1995); N.Rollings, ’Cracks in the post-war Keynesian settlement? The role of 
organised business in Britain in the rise of neo-liberalism before Margaret Thatcher’ 
Twentieth Century British History 24  (2013):  637-659. 
61 Cannadine, ‘Apocalpyse when?’; E. Green, Thatcher (London, 2006), 55-60. 
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back’ of the state. One key measure of that ‘rolling-back’ are trends in public spending. 
These show that, whatever their intentions, governments have struggled to cut that 
expenditure. As Martin Daunton stresses, ‘Public expenditure was 42.2% of GDP when 
Mrs Thatcher came to power, and 42.3% in 1995/6. Mrs Thatcher did not roll back the 
state.’ 62 In the Thatcher/Major years, absolute levels of expenditure grew significantly.  
Under New Labour, despite initially following highly restrictive policies, in the new 
millennium public expenditure shot up.  As a result, by the eve of the financial crisis in 
2007, public spending had grown to 240 per cent of its level in 1970; there had been no 
fiscal ‘race to the bottom’ (see Figure 1).    
 
Perhaps even more significantly, not only has total spending risen, but the proportion 
of this total spent on the welfare state has grown. Spending on health care and education 
have both risen as a share of GDP. In social security, while the aim of squeezing the 
incomes of the unemployed has been carried through, overall social security spending 
has risen in line with GDP.63 This fact is particularly significant when one notes the 
centrality of anti-welfare state ideas to all types of neo-liberalism. The precise desired 
limits to state welfare provision were disputed amongst neo-liberals in the early years 
of the development of the doctrine, but the kind of expansion seen from the 1960s was 
unanimously anathemized.64  In Britain, the neo-liberal think-tank the Institute of 
Economic Affairs ‘has stood out for the strength of its attack on the so-called “welfare 
state”’, and this issue dominated its early publications. 65  Yet in a spending sense we 
have since the 1970s moved from a ‘warfare state’ to a truly ‘welfare state’, a 
paradoxical consequence if one believes neo-liberalism has been triumphant.66 
 
Equally, for all the talk in the 1980s of the defeat of Keynesianism by monetarism, 
fiscal policy, while strongly repudiated in the crisis of the early 1980s, was not 
permanently defeated. As the initial expansionary fiscal responses to the crises of the 
early 1990s and 2008-10 demonstrate, fiscal stimulation in time of recession remained 
alive and well.67 
 
                                                 
62 M. Daunton, Just Taxes. The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 (Cambridge, 2002), 
338. 
63  A. Jowett and M. Hardie, ‘Longer Term Trends-Public Sector Finance’ ONS, November 2014; 
 OBR, Welfare Trends Report (London, 2014), 5. 
64 R. Backhouse, B. Bateman, T. Nishizawa and D. Plehwe (eds.), Liberalism and the Welfare State. 
Economists and Arguments for the Welfare State (Oxford, 2017). 
65 N. Bosanquet,  After the New Right (London, 1983), 75; these anti welfare state publications are 
summarised in R. Harris and A. Seldon, Overruled on Welfare (London, 1979). 
66 D. Edgerton, The Warfare State. Britain 1920-1970 (Cambridge, 2005). 
67 Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, chapter 3. 
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Source:  ONS database. 
 
Commenting on the Thatcher period Peter Taylor-Gooby remarked that: ‘One verdict 
on Thatcher’s legacy might be that the policies failed but that the ideology grows ever 
stronger.’ 68  This suggests a wider problem in discussing neo-liberalism in Britain; its 
undoubted ideological virulence cannot be taken as a straightforward measure of its 
implementation.69 This is not to dispute that neo-liberal ideas have been significant 
ideological underpinnings to some hugely important changes in post-1970s Britain. 
Labour market de-regulation coupled with anti-trade union policies have helped to 
engineer major changes in the economic and political landscape. Alongside this, as 
Avner Offer has persuasively argued, one of the most striking and significant economic 
(and social) changes in Britain since the 1970s has been the multiplication of private 
debt (which now finances not only house purchase but the great bulk of new cars as 
well as other consumer items). He argues that this is linked to a switch away from a 
broadly social democratic notion of collective risk-bearing, to one of individuals having 
to provide as best they can for life’s contingencies, which has commonly meant 
household debt accumulation, in turn an important aspect of the wider phenomenon of 
‘financialization’, a key shift in corporate structure and behaviour. 70  
 
                                                 
68  ‘Commentary’ in C.Hay and S. Farrall (eds.), The Legacy of Thatcherism  (Oxf.ord, 2014) .104. 
69 For the attempt to apply neo-liberal notions to Universities, see M. Wolf ‘Uses and abuses of 
economics in the debate on universities’ January 2017:  thttp://cdbu.org.uk/uses-and-abuses-of-
economics-in-the-debate-on-universities/ (accessed 20th September 2017) 
70 A. Offer, ‘Narrow banking, real estate, and financial stability in the UK c.1870-2019’ in by 
N. Dimsdale and A. Hotson (eds.), British Financial Crises since 1825, (Oxford, 2014), 158-
173;  J.Froud, S. Johal, A. Leaver and K. Williams, Financialization and Strategy. Narratives 
and Numbers (Oxford, 2006). 
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Alongside the multiplication of debt, the outstanding effect of the change in policy at 
the end of the 1970s was the profound increase in inequality in the following decade.71 
The scale of this shift seems to have resulted from a conjunction of forces: as Hills 
notes, ‘most of the factors determining income distribution were pushing in the same 
direction. 72  But while the shift was not all policy-driven, there is no doubt that neo-
liberal policies made a substantial contribution, and this was consonant with the 
ideological assault on the pursuit of greater equality by social democracy. 
 
The key problem with the ‘triumph of neo-liberalism’ as a general narrative about post-
war Britain is that its success as a policy programme has been seriously constrained by 
changes in circumstances, especially changes in industrial structure and the labour 
market, almost entirely beyond its control. As argued in Section I, de-industrialization 
in part derives its explanatory strength from the understanding it can offer about how 
economic change has driven supposedly ‘neo-liberal’ governments to both enormously 
increase subsidies in the labour and housing markets, and to greatly increase state 
intervention in that market by a statutory, national minimum wage. We can summarize 
this by saying that de-industrialization has acted as a major constraint on the realization 
of any neo-liberal programme of ‘rolling-back the state’. 
  
Neo-liberalism is too broad a term to give us much insight into the spatial differentiation 
of Britain’s urban economies. In an ultra-centralised polity like modern Britain, urban 
areas have found it extremely difficult to pursue distinctive, non neo-liberal economic 
programmes. The important analysis of London’s problems in the London Industrial 
Strategy was note above, but the body that threatened to follow-up such analysis with 
strategies of public intervention, the Greater London Council, was abolished by central 
government before those strategies had time to develop. 
 
V 
 
While declinism and ‘triumph of neo-liberalism’ narratives have mainly been deployed 
to analyse the national economy, globalization has been used to seek to explain 
geographical differences. The Brexit decision in June 2016 stimulated an argument that 
the vote could be explained in large part by economic factors, the creation of a 
significant section of the population who had been disadvantaged by the spatially-
uneven economic consequences of globalization. Proponents of this view ranged from 
journalists to Christine Lagarde, Managing-Director of the IMF. 73 One obvious 
qualification to such claims, linking economic disadvantage to Leave voting, is that the 
(small) Leave majority was most strikingly characterised by its greater age and weaker 
                                                 
71 I. Gazeley,  ‘Income and living standards, 1870-2010’ in R. Floud, J. Hunphries and P. 
Johnson (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain vol. II  1870 to the Present ,  
(Cambridge, 2014), 154-63. 
72 J.Hills, Introduction’, in J. Hills (ed.), New Inequalities (London, 1996), 11. 
73 Larry Elliott, Guardian, 26th June 2016; Lagarde, Sylvia Ostry lecture in September 2016 
‘Making Globalization Work for All’: https://www.imf.org/en/News/.../sp09132016-
Making-Globalization-Work-for-All      (accessed 15 June 2017). 
In this view, globalisation has brought economic advantage to many, but equally left behind 
many others. Leave voting (and likewise support from Trump in the US and Le Pen in 
France) is explained as an expression of the anger of the ‘left behind’. 
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educational profile, rather than directly by economic condition. 74  The decision to leave 
the EU was a clear victory for traditional Conservative voters, many of whom live in 
the prosperous South of England, rather than in less well-off parts of the country; two-
thirds of those who voted Labour in 2015 voted Remain. Overall, we can perhaps 
helpfully characterise the Leave vote as an alliance between those who favoured ‘taking 
back control’, and those who saw the vote as a means of expressing opposition to their 
economic difficulties.  
 
But insofar as Brexit reflected underlying economic discontent in some parts of the UK, 
is it helpful to link this to the effects of globalization?  Globalization is multi-
dimensional, involving freer movement of goods, capital and (to a much lesser extent) 
people, and has complex implications. But in terms of its most important economic 
effects on the British population, the argument made here is that in seeking to 
understand the economic basis of the Brexit vote, we should concentrate not on 
globalisation but on the long-term impact of de-industrialisation. It has been that 
process of de-industrialization, outlined in Section I, that has underpinned much of the 
growth of sharp spatial divisions in economic conditions across Britain.  
 
The post-Brexit debate tended to conflate these two issues. For example, Diana Coyle 
wrote ‘The UK's "Leave" vote could be seen as a vote against globalisation and its 
uneven impact on different parts of the country, rather than a vote specifically against 
the EU. The proportions voting for Leave were higher in the Midlands and North of 
England, where deindustrialisation struck hardest and where average incomes have 
stagnated.’75  Such claims reflect a common error of conflating globalization and de-
industrialization, a confusion which ignores the clear historical evidence of the way de-
industrialization began long before the current phase of globalisation. 
  
Globalisation has contributed to de-industrialization, but it is only one contributor, and 
historically not the most important. As shown in Table 1, de-industrialization began in 
Britain in the 1950s. It was driven by shifts in patterns of demand and technological 
change, most strikingly in increasing the growth of productivity (and lowering the 
relative price) of manufactured goods. Since 1948 the annual increase in labour 
productivity in services has been around 1.48 per cent, in manufacturing 2.78 per cent 
(‘Industry’ is normally defined in the official statistics as manufacturing, plus mining 
plus construction. Mining has almost disappeared, but construction has come to employ 
almost as many workers as manufacturing; productivity growth in construction is 
significantly slower than in manufacturing).  
 
Note that the in that same period, industrial output has not fallen, but grown slowly on 
trend, so it is now at an all-time high. These employment trends have affected all 
industrial countries, so that industrial employment has fallen substantially even in 
successful industrial countries with a manufacturing trade surplus, such as Germany.76  
                                                 
74 See http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/.  
(accessed 28 April 2017). 
75 D. Coyle, ‘Brexit and Globalisation’ Vox http://voxeu.org/article/brexit-and-globalisation. 
August 2016. 
76 Indeed the effects are almost universal: those most hard hit by de-industrialization are not 
the rich countries, but much of  South America and Sub-Saharan Africa: D. Rodrik, 
‘Premature deindustrialization’ Journal of Economic Growth 21 (2016), 1-33.  
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Industrial employment there has fallen more slowly than in Britain, but as a share of 
the total has more than halved since its peak in 1970. 77  
 
The long-run nature of these changes, which long pre-dated the late twentieth century 
surge in globalization can be illustrated with some examples. Take the pattern for coal, 
shown in Figure 1. The longevity of these trends is illustrated by the fact that many 
more coal-mining jobs were lost in Britain under Harold Wilson’s government of the 
1960s than under Margaret Thatcher’s government of the 1980s. These trends reflected 
the collapse in industrial and domestic uses of coal, and latterly the shift away from 
coal in electricity generation. 
 
Coal is important for our understanding of de-industrialization in a number of ways. 
The trajectory sketched above emphasizes the long-run nature of its decline, but also 
how much of this occurred during the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and especially the 
1960s. In this period the impact of its decline was much mitigated by the ‘moral 
economy’ of the period, which meant that policy was predicated on the need to provide 
alternative jobs elsewhere in the coal industry, or alternative jobs in other sectors in the 
local economy. 78 While the economic welfare effects of these shifts are complex, it 
seems clear that they were much less severe than in the years from the 1980s, when that 
moral economy broke down, and redundancy in the coalfields was often a route into 
unemployment or low-paid work, with coalminers’ wives rarely able to ‘compensate’ 
household incomes by finding well-paid local employment. 
 
It should also be noted that the moral economy of coal in the years down to the 1980s 
involved a nationalised industry acting, up to a point, as a ‘humane’ manager of decline. 
This role was hugely important in the nationalised industries in the 1950s and 1960s, 
because they saw some of the largest employment contractions.  One calculation 
suggests that eighty per cent of the decline in employment in mining and manufacturing 
in North-East England between 1951 and 1981 was in the public sector, plus another 
20,000 in nationalised railways.79 
 
                                                 
77 C. Feinstein,’Structural change in the developed countries in the twentieth century’    
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15 (1999), 35-55. 
78 J.Phillips, ‘De-industrialization and the moral economy of  the Scottish coalfields, 1947-
1991’, International Labor and Working Class History, 84 , no.1 (2013):  99-115. 
79 R. Hudson, ‘Producing an industrial wasteland: capital, labour and the state in North-East 
England’ in Martin and Rowthorn, The Geography of De-industrialisation  (Basingstoke, 
1986), 181. (This includes iron and steel (nationalised 1967) and shipbuilding, (nationalised 
1977); J.Tomlinson, ‘A “Failed Experiment”? Public Ownership and the Narratives of Post-
War Britain’ Labour History Review 73 (2008), 199-214. 
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Source:  M.Kerai, ‘Coal statistics in 2012’ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170708
/et_article_coal_in_2012.pdf (accessed 28 April 2017). 
 
 
It is true that with the decline of the British coal industry (deep-mining of coal ended 
in 2016), Britain has become a coal importer, with 25 million tons of imports in 2015.  
But if we ask as  simple counter-factual how many jobs would be created if that coal 
were produced at home, the number would be perhaps 12,500. This is not a trivial 
number, but it would only take employment back to the level of the year 2000, and, of 
course, leave the numbers a tiny fraction of the industry’s previous size (and the main 
source of demand, coal-generation of electricity, is due to be phased out by 2025).  
 
The history of the steel industry is also highly instructive. The chart below shows 
employment in this industry alongside output. Iron and Steel has lost 95 per cent of its 
workforce since 1971, the great bulk of the fall coming in the1980s (50 per cent of the 
fall in 1979-1981). Over the same period of forty-five years, output fell much less, by 
approximately 50 per cent. Two points about this history should be stressed. First, 
Britain still produces a considerable amount of steel, but huge increases in productivity 
(and changes in the composition of output) mean this output can be produced with far 
fewer workers. Second, the fall in output owes little to the Chinese competition which 
has been so much emphasized in recent discussions. There was no big surge of Chinese 
imports until the 2000s; indeed, China was a steel importer well into the 1990s. 
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Source: C. Rhodes, ‘UK steel industry: statistics and policy’ House of Commons 
Briefing Paper 07317, 28 October 2016, 6, 9. 
 
 
Similar stories of long-run decline could be told of textiles and clothing and 
shipbuilding. But also important is the story of more characteristically ‘modern’ 
industries such as car manufacturing. Like iron and steel, output has diminished since 
the early 1970s peak, but has revived since the financial crisis to well over 90 per cent 
of that peak (though the composition of output has of course altered significantly).  
However, again because of productivity gains, far fewer workers are needed to produce 
a car than was the case forty years ago. While today car manufacturing directly employs 
around 150,000 workers, in 1972 the figure was half a million for only slightly more 
output.80 
 
The key point here is that, if by some extraordinary circumstance, globalisation, defined 
in relation to trade flows, was somehow reversed, it would not return Britain to having 
anything like the number of industrial jobs that existed in the 1950s (or 1980s). Some 
future increase in industrial jobs is of course possible, including by the expansion of 
such sectors as renewable energy. But the idea of a wholesale ‘re-industrialisation’ 
which would offset the effects of the profound changes in demand and productivity (as 
well as globalization) of recent decades is fantastical.81 
 
                                                 
80 F. Mor and J. Brown, The Motor Industry: Statistics and Policy, House of Commons 
Briefing Paper 00611, April 2017. 
81 There is a separate, important,  argument to be made about ‘de-globalization’ which cannot 
be pursued here, but see J. Tomlinson, ‘De-globalization and its significance: from the 
particular to the general’ Contemporary British History 26 (2012), 213-230. 
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Our three case studies are also instructive on the limits of the globalization narrative in 
explaining their economic fortunes.82  London, as noted, was a pioneer of de-
industrialization, this being strongly evident from the 1950s, and long before the post-
war revival of globalization had got into its stride. Insofar as this process involved the 
flight of jobs to other locations, those locations were overwhelmingly elsewhere in 
Britain (especially Southern England), not to other parts of the globe. Globalization did 
play a part in the economic development in High Wycombe and Dundee, especially in 
the latter case and the demise of jute employment. But their overall economic 
development was more directly to do with technological change and rising 
manufacturing productivity than global integration per se. 
 
     VI 
De-industrialization, understood as a national phenomenon, but with spatially highly-
differentiated effects, should be at the heart of our understanding of British urban 
history over the last sixty years. It has been crucial to changes in the labour market, and 
to the wage polarization, increased unemployment and insecurity which have 
characterised that market. In this respect it has been more general and long-term than 
the effects of globalization, which in their direct impact on the labour market are best 
seen as a contributor to de-industrialization. De-industrialization, in turn, has been a 
major constraint on ‘rolling back the state’, not only by weakening the fiscal position 
overall, and in particular leading to the explosion in wage subsidies. Further, in 
encouraging a political consensus around a national statutory minimum wage, it has 
contradicted a key element of neo-liberal economic thinking.  
 
This is not to suggest that de-industrialization should monopolize historical explanation 
of this period. While some of their explanatory limits have been suggested above, 
narratives which argue for the significance of the rise of neo-liberalism and the process 
of globalization are plainly not to be dismissed. A complete analysis of these decades 
would no doubt need to employ these terms alongside de-industrialization. 
 
Some of the potential weaknesses of de-industrialization as a framework also need to 
be recognised. First, we need to be clear that the de-industrialization discussed here is 
just one form the phenomenon can take:  there are many varieties in other places and 
times, and with highly diverse effects and implications. 83 The argument here is limited 
in space and time to Britain in the post-1945 years.  
 
Second, especially because so many accounts of de-industrialization in Britain have 
focused on the closures and the struggles surrounding these, it is unsurprising perhaps 
that such accounts often effectively re-introduce notions of ‘decline’ by the back door, 
by seeing the loss of industry as evidence of profound economic malaise. This is 
perhaps particularly true of the literature produced in the 1980s, when the scale of 
                                                 
82 It is ironic that the least prosperous of the three, Dundee, voted strongly against Brexit—in Scotland 
at least, politics was in command at the referendum. 
83 C. Johnson, ‘Introduction: de-industrialization and globalization’ International Review of 
Social History 47 (2002), 3-33. 
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closures was immense and ‘declinism’ seemed a potent framework of understanding. 
84 But it can also be found in more recent literature, whether academic or popular.85 
 
Such ‘declinist’ approaches to de-industrialization also encourage nostalgic accounts 
of the industrial past, suggesting the innate superiority of the industrial world we have 
lost. But whilst the account given here has emphasized the historical and continuing 
costs of the transition to a service-dominated economy, the benefits of that transition 
also need to be recognized.  
 
First, the expansion of non-industrial employment has contributed significantly to 
widening the labour market opportunities for women, given how many industrial jobs 
were effectively barred to them. Illiberal notions of masculinity were deeply embedded 
in industrial structures. While the expansion of less horizontally segregated service 
sector jobs has not, of course,  been the only factor in expanding women’s labour market 
participation, is has played a significant part.86 On the other hand, the impact of de-
industrialization on the gender pay gap may have been adverse, as some American 
evidence suggests.87 
 
Second, work in the service sector is typically cleaner and healthier than jobs in 
industry, (this has contributed to some relative improvement in the health of men 
compared with women, as the latter jobs have declined).88  It hardly needs emphasizing 
how high was the toll of injury, and death in coal-mining, and other industries exacted 
a high if not comparable loss.89 Work in the service sector is highly polarized, which 
means that alongside the ‘lousy’ jobs there has been a huge increase in ‘lovely’ forms 
of employment, which in turn has been connected with the enormous expansion of 
tertiary education, and all the benefits that accrue from that expansion. 
 
These points are made to emphasize the need for caution in using de-industrialization 
as an explanatory framework; the need to avoid attempts either to give the term a 
‘magical’ capacity to explain absolutely everything, or, alternatively, to imbue it with 
a wholly negative moralistic force. Equally, drawing on the three examples given 
above, the divergences in the geographies, chronologies and effects of de-
industrialization in Britain should always be kept in mind. But, notwithstanding such 
cautions, there is no other broad-brush term which, used with care, seems to offer such 
                                                 
84 Martin and Rowthorn, The Geography of Deindustrialization; D. Massey  and R. Meegan, 
The Anatomy of Job Loss: the How, Where and Why of Employment Decline (London,1982); 
J. Foster and C. Woolfson, The Politics of the UCS Work-in: Class Alliances and the Right to 
Work (London, 1986); H. Levie, D. Gregory and N. Lorentzen (eds.), Fighting Closures: De-
industrialization and the Trade Unions (Nottingham, 1984); on the historiography of de-
industrialization: S. High, ‘”The wounds of class”: a historiographical reflection on the study 
of deindustrialization, 1973-2013’ History Compass 11 (2013), 994-1007. 
85 Kitson and Michie, ‘The de-industrial revolution’; N. Comfort, Surrender: How British 
Industry Gave up the Ghost (London, 2012). 
86 S. Horrell, ‘Living standards in Britain 1900-2000: Women’s century?’ National Institute 
Economic Review 172 (2000), 70. 
87 E. Kruger, ‘Is deindustrialization good for women?’ Feminist Economics 14 (2008), 73-92. 
88 Horrell, ‘Living standards’. 
89 R. Davies and P.Jones,  Trends and Content to Rates of  Workplace Injury (HSE/Warwick, 
2005).  
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fertility for understanding British economic and social development over the last six 
decades. 
 
 
 
 
